We study the Bertrand equilibrium in duopoly in which two firms produce a homogeneous good under quadratic cost functions, and they seek to maximize the weighted sum of their absolute and relative profits. We show that there exists a range of the equilibrium prices in duopolistic equilibria. This range of equilibrium prices is narrower and lower than the range of the equilibrium prices in duopolistic equilibria under pure absolute profit maximization, and the larger the weight on the relative profit, the narrower and lower the range of the equilibrium prices. In this sense relative profit maximization is more aggressive than absolute profit maximization.
Introduction
We study the Bertrand equilibrium in duopoly in which two firms produce a homogeneous good under quadratic cost functions, and they seek to maximize the weighted sum of their absolute and relative profits instead of their absolute profits themselves. The relative profit of a firm is the difference between its absolute profit and the absolute profit of the rival firm.
In recent years, maximizing relative profit instead of absolute profit has aroused the interest of economists. For analyses of relative profit maximization see Schaffer (1989) , Vega-Redondo (1997) , Lundgren (1996) , Kockesen et. al. (2000) , Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato(2013) , Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and Lu (2011) . In another paper, Tanaka (2013) , we have shown that under relative profit maximization the choice of strategic variables is irrelevant to the outcome in duopoly. In that paper we considered a duopoly with differentiated goods. On the other hand, in this paper we assume that the firms produce a homogeneous good under quadratic cost functions, and set their prices.
We show the following results. 1. When the firms seek to maximize their pure absolute profits, there exists no monopolistic equilibrium, which is an equilibrium where only one firm sells the good. And there exists a range of the equilibrium prices in duopolistic equilibria, which are equilibria where both firms set the same price. In duopolistic equilibria the firms may earn positive absolute profits. 2. When the firms seek to maximize the weighted sum of their absolute and relative profits, also there exists no monopolistic equilibrium, and there exists a range of the equilibrium prices in duopolistic equilibria. This range of equilibrium prices is contained in the range of the equilibrium prices in duopolistic equilibria under pure absolute profit maximization, and the range under relative profit maximization is narrower and lower than the range under absolute profit maximization. The larger the weight on the relative profit, the narrower and lower the range of the equilibrium prices. In this sense relative profit maximization is more aggressive than absolute profit maximization. In duopolistic equilibria the firms may earn positive absolute profits.
The model
There are two firms, A and B. They produce a homogeneous good. The price of the good of Firm A is ‫‬ and the price of the good of Firm B is ‫‬ . 0 ൏ ‫‬ ൏ 1 and 0 ൏ ‫‬ ൏ 1. The outputs of Firm A and B are denoted, respectively, by ‫ݍ‬ and ‫ݍ‬ . The firms set the prices of their goods, and consumers buy the good from the firm whose price is lower. Let ‫‬ ൌ minሼ‫‬ , ‫‬ ሽ. Consumers' demand is represented by the following inverse demand function.
If ‫‬ ൌ ‫‬ , each firm acquires a half of the demand, and two firms constitute a duopoly. Thus,
On the other hand, if ‫‬ ൏ ‫‬ (or ‫‬ ൏ ‫‬ ) Firm A (or Firm B) acquires total demand, and it becomes a monopolist. Thus, if ‫‬ ൏ ‫‬ , In monopoly the absolute profit of a firm other than the monopolist is zero. Thus, the absolute profit and the relative profit of the monopolist are equal, and the objective of the monopolist is its absolute profit, that is, if Firm A is a monopolist,
and if Firm B is a monopolist,
Without loss of generality we assume ‫‬ ‫‬ . Call a firm in duopoly a duopolist. From these formulas we obtain the following results. 
We can show 
Therefore, the larger the value of ߙ (the weight on the relative profit), the lower the value of ‫‬ҧ .
Absolute profit maximization
In this section for reference we consider a case where each firm seeks to maximize its absolute profit. For details see Dastidar(1995 . Then, the profits of duopolists are non-negative. If Firm B (or A) sets ‫‬ (or ‫‬ ) lower than ‫‬ (or ‫‬ ), it becomes a monopolist but its profit decreases or does not change.
3. Of course if ‫‬ ൌ ‫‬ and ‫‬ ൏ ଶା , the profits of the firms are negative, so each firm can set its price higher than the price of the rival firm and make its profit zero.
Q.E.D.
Relative profit maximization
In this section we consider a case where each firm seeks to maximize the weighted sum of its absolute profit and its relative profit. , the absolute profits of the firms are negative and their relative profits are zero, so each firm can set its price higher than the price of the rival firm and make its absolute profit zero and its relative profit positive since the absolute profit of the rival firm is negative because (4) the larger the weight on the relative profit, ߙ, the narrower and lower the range of the equilibrium prices. Therefore, relative profit maximization is more aggressive than absolute profit maximization.
